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John Bradley and John D Fitz Gerald 
Introduction 
The Institute publishes its Medium-Term Review approximately every eighteen 
months. 1 The R.eview attempts to project likely prospects for the Irish economy, 
predicated on trends in the world economy and the stance of domestic policy. 
Since we published our last Review in June 1989, some important and 
unexpected political events have taken place in Eastern Europe which could 
have substantial political and economic implications for developments within 
the EC and Ireland over the next few years. These events were not foreseen 
when we wrote the Review last June, although many of the other forces 
determining our future growth have developed as we expected ( e.g., the 
impending slow-down of the UK economy, relatively buoyant growth in the rest 
of the EC and the implementation of the EC Structural Fund projects, albeit 
at a lower level and different timing than envisaged in the National Development 
Plan 1989-1993). 
Changes in the Review's short-term forecast include a rise in nominal and real 
interest rates and an upward revision in the Irish growth rate for 1989. There 
is a consequent reduction in the forecast growth for 1990. 2 However, the latest 
growth forecast for 1990 is still well above average growth for the 1980s. Apart 
from these changes in the timing of the Irish recovery, economic prospects in 
the EC and the rest of the world economy remain broadly favourable, implying 
equally favourable prospects for Ireland over the foreseeable future. 
The production of the complete Review involves a major commitment of time 
and resources. However, because of the widespread use of the Review both here 
and abroad, we feel it may be useful to provide a limited revision of the 
medium-term forecasts to take account of developments in Ireland and the rest 
of the world up to the first quarter of this year. We first discuss the economic 
environment at home and abroad, concentrating on changes since last June. 
We then present a revised aggregate benchmark forecast for the period to 1994, 
eliminating much of the sectoral and other detail of the full Review. Also, we 
have not considered a range of options or scenarios or explored the sensitivity 
of our projection to alternative assumptions. Thus the results presented here 
are more tentative than the fully developed scenarios normally contained in a 
complete Review. 
1 The next issue, to cover the five-year period 1991 to 1996, is scheduled for publication in December of this 
year. 
2See this Commentary. 
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The External Environment 
The European Community 
The · implementation of the Single European Market in the EC and 
movement towards monetary union will continue to be the strategic forces 
determining trends in the Irish economy over the next five years. There is still 
much uncertainty as to what exact changes 1992 will require in Ireland and 
whether the original time-table will be adhered to. Nevertheless, we already 
have sufficient information to make some forecasts of the effects on Ireland. 3 
Indeed, the effects of 1992 have already begun to be felt both through increased 
domestic expenditure funded by the Community Support Framework (i.e., the 
Structural Funds) and through changes in the structure of some sectors of the 
Irish industry and services ( e.g., distribution and financial services). 
In analysing the possible impact of 1992 on Ireland in the last Review, a 
number of problem areas were identified. However, it was felt that overall the 
impact would be favourable. The areas identified as likely to undergo 
significant change were the distribution and financial sectors. On balance the 
effects on the industrial sector were thought likely to be favourable. Although 
the National Economic and Social Council in a major report published last 
autumn was less optimistic than we were, the differences may be more apparent 
than real. The NESC report suggests that without a policy of increased 
international transfers within the EC, market completion could widen the gap 
between the richer and the poorer EC members. However, this is consistent 
with our view that the Irish economy will be better off after 1992 than would 
be the case if the EC were to continue merely as a customs union and not to 
progress towards a more complete economic and monetary union. 
Since the last Review a number of detailed studies have been carried out 
under the auspices of the Department of the Taoiseach's EUROPEN 
programme. Those covering the engineering sectors and the computer sector 
indicated that they were unlikely to be adversely affected by the impact of 
19924 . Because most of the manufacturing sector already operates in a 
competitive market it should not experience a major change in circumstances 
after 1992. Obviously there will be some exceptions, especially where firms are 
very dependent on the home market. One example was the loss of employment 
in baking during the 'sliced-bread war' last year, at least some of which must 
be attributed to 1992. 5 
Because of the high degree of export orientation of Irish industry, anything 
which improves access to foreign markets will be beneficial. The ending of 
restrictions on public procurement within the EC will help a number of Irish 
firms. However, firms which are dependent on the home market for much of 
their profits - markets that are likely to be even more fiercely contested after 
1992 - may be adversely affected. 
The Cecchini Report highlighted the importance of economies which result 
from the increase in scale of operation for firms in the EC arising from the 
3See O'Sullivan, L. "Macroeconomic Effects of 1992" in]. Bradley and]. Fitz Gerald, Medium-Term Review: 
1989-1991-, ESRI, 1989. 
4£. O'Malley, 1990. 1992 and the Electronic, Electrical and Instrument Engineering Sectors, EUROPEN. T.J. Baker 
and S. Scott, 1990. 1992 and the Metal and Mechanical Engineering Sector, EUROPEN. 
5Some further adverse consequences were identified in the distribution sector of services Q. Fitz Gerald, 
1990, 1992 and the Distribution Sector, EUROPEN). 
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larger market. Those firms which can expand to exploit economies of large 
scale operation will clearly be the winners, and many medium-sized firms may 
be squeezed out. However, the bulk of Irish industrial production is 
concentrated in areas which are less likely to be affected by increases in the 
scale of operation. This means that although we may not benefit greatly from 
the growth of those firms which win the expansion race and reap the benefits 
of scale economies, we may not lose either because smaller firms shut down. 
This is consistent with the NESC view that those areas of the EC which have 
the likely winners in the scale race will grow more rapidly than the EC average. 
Eastern Europe 
· Our last Review contained not a single reference to Eastern Europe! The lack 
of importance of this region to Ireland, as perceived last year, can be 
summarised in FIGURE 1 (which shows Irish imports by countries of origin) 
and FIGURE 2 (which shows Irish exports by area of destination). In each 
case, less than 1 per cent of our trade was with the East Block. As regards 
imports, these are dominated by oil (from the USSR) and coal (from Poland). 
Exports, although small in size, are more heterogeneous. Of course, within this 
small overall total export share, Irish companies have been carving out niche 
markets (e.g., Aer Rianta in the USSR, Guinness-Peat Aviation in other 
Eastern Block countries). Nevertheless, if COMECON had continued without 
change, Eastern Europe would have been an unlikely location for dynamic and 
growing markets. 
FIGURE 1 
Irish Imports by Countries of Origin 
Jan-Nov 1989 
UK 
41% 
FRG 
9% 
USSA34% 
C3DA7% 
Poland 41% 
Hungart~% Czecn 10% 
Other 5% 
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FIGURE2 
Irish Exports by Area of Destination 
Jan-Nov 1989 
USSR 51% 
GDR6% 
Poland 17% 
Hungary 11% 
Czech 10% 
Other 5% 
All has now changed and the nations of Eastern Europe, within a startlingly 
short space of time, have rejected central planning and communism and 
embraced the market economy and liberal democracy. These developments, 
while universally welcomed in the West, have given rise to considerable 
uncertainty about the future. It is unusual, though interesting, to see world 
experts, particularly in Germany, uncertain as to how best to react to changing 
circumstances. These developments also give rise to some uncertainty about 
our own economic future because of our close integration into the European 
economy. 
It is necessary to examine the possible consequences of the turmoil and 
change in Eastern Europe in a wider context than that currently used in the 
media. In so far as they affect Ireland, the developments in Eastern Europe can 
be best examined in two parts or stages. The first and more complex set of 
effects will arise from the political reunification of Germany and the 
consequential integration of the economies of the Federal Republic (FRG) and 
the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Because of the central role of the 
Federal Republic in the EC, the disruption and changes which will affect 
Germany during a rapid reunification will have a much more immediate 
impact on the economies of the rest of the EC. The second, more clearcut 
though longer term, effect arises from the changes in the East Block other than 
the German Democratic Republic. 
German Reunification: 
The implications of German reunification for the EC and Ireland are much 
more complex than are the immediate changes in the rest of Eastern Europe. 
Because of the central role of the Deutchmark in the EMS and in the world· 
financial system, any shock to the German economy is likely to have large 
consequential effects on the rest of the EC. Much attention has been focussed 
on the issue of German monetary union (i.e., the conversion of East German 
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Ostmark to D-marks at a limited one-for-one exchange). While the direct 
effects of this conversion could be inflationary, there are other aspects to 
German unification which may have a longer lasting inflationary impact. 
The FRG will have to fund further large scale financial transfers to the less 
developed GDR. They will also have to deal with, what is for them, a new 
phenomenon, i.e., a large unemployed or underemployed labour force. It is 
clear that the Federal Republic government has no easy answers and the 
government and the Bundesbank have openly disagreed on the correct 
approach to the emerging problems. 
Until early this year most international forecasters were confidently 
predicting a low rate of inflation in the Federal Republic over the next five years 
together with a strong D-mark 4nd interest rates below the average for other 
developed countries. However, the transfer of funds to what is now the GDR 
will tend to raise demand and fuel inflation. Unless deflationary action is taken 
in what is now the Federal Republic, some of this demand will flow out through 
increased imports leading to a lower German balance of payments surplus. 
While increasing demand for exports from Ireland and other EC countries the 
reduced surplus would, if unchecked, tend to weaken the position of the D-
mark, further adding to inflation. 
In the mid-1970s when the Federal Republic was previously faced with an 
inflationary shock due to the rise in oil prices, the reaction was clearcut. 
Interest rates were raised, leading to an appreciation of the D-mark. This 
reduced the inflationary pressure and made German firms less competitive. 
The result was a fall in employment of over 5 per cent. However, German 
unemployment as a percentage of the German labour force only rose by 3 per 
cent as many foreign migrant workers were laid off and were obliged to return 
to their countries of origin. 
The situation is very different today since the newly unemployed and 
underemployed will be German citizens. The earlier mechanism for reducing 
the labour force is no longer available. On the contrary, there will be a need 
to increase employment rapidly in the private sector in the wake of the 
adjustment of the economy of the GDR to Western ways. While access to the 
new pool of relatively skilled workers in the GDR will relieve German labour 
shortages which exist in certain sectors, it is possible that there will remain a 
large number of underemployed or unemployed workers. The policy of 
maintaining a strong D-mark exchange rate, making German exports less 
competitive, will make the solution of this problem much more intractable. 
Financial markets not only adjust rapidly, they adjust in the present to 
expectations of future developments. The above uncertainty has brought about 
a rapid and substantial rise in long-term interest rates in Germany. This rise, 
which has not as yet been accompanied by any significant increase in German 
inflation, is quite serious for Ireland. If sustained, it could reduce Irish growth 
this year and next year. However, as an offset to the negative effect of higher 
German interest rates, the weakness of the D-mark will help the convergence 
of Irish and D-mark interest rates. Ireland may also benefit from an increase 
in competitiveness (caused by a weaker D-mark on world currency markets) 
and from the likely increase in the rate of growth of the united German 
economy as the eastern region develops. 
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Eastern Europe: 
The opening up of the economies of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and, 
to a lesser extent, the USSR will also affect the Irish economy. These countries, 
with their traditions of industry and their present low labour costs, will 
potentially be competitors with Ireland in the market place for mobile 
multinational foreign direct .. investment. The IDA have already expressed 
concern about this possibility. 6 
The growth of an alternative market attracting foreign investment to Eastern 
Europe could adversely affect Ireland. The attraction of Eastern Europe will 
be particularly important for German firms. Surveys have shown that as part 
of the 1992 process many were already considering investing elsewhere in 
Europe. The attraction of what is now the GDR, which has a relatively low 
paid but skilled labour force, will clearly prove a major draw for such firms. 
The tradition in the GDR and Czechoslovakia of heavy engineering industry 
and the resulting availability of workers with engineering skills will make 
investment in the East attractive, for example, for car manufacturing firms. 
However, while German investment is important to the Irish economy, it has 
in the past accounted for a minority of the foreign direct investment here. At 
present 5 per cent of manufacturing employment is accounted for by German 
owned firms whereas all foreign owned firms, taken together, account for over 
40 per cent of total employment in that sector. For firms from other countries, 
such as the US and Japan, the attractions of possibly lower labour costs in 
Eastern Europe will probably be outweighed by uncertainty about the future 
and doubts about access to the EC market. For the moment Japanese computer 
chips made in Hungary would probably be looked on by the EC with as much 
disfavour as if they were made in Ja pan. This will be strengthened by the fact 
that our workforce has already developed the skills needed by the high-tech 
firms setting up here. 
Secondly, the newly liberalised nations of Eastern Europe are likely to seek 
some form of association with the EC, perhaps even full membership. Hence, 
given their low state of development, they will also be competitors in the search 
for development assistance within the EC. While the assistance to Ireland 
under the EC Community Support Framework (CSF) is guaranteed up to 1993, the 
need to aid developing economies in Eastern Europe could lead to a reduction 
in the funds available to Ireland after that date. 
A diversion of the EC budget towards Eastern Europe, including the GDR, 
is a real possibility. While the EC peripheral regional aid framework ( the CSF) 
does guarantee an increase in the support for Ireland up to 1993, there is no 
guarantee as to the level of support thereafter. Even before that date Ireland 
may be called on to increase its contribution to the EC budget to fund 
assistance to Eastern Europe. The problems of the GDR are likely to make a 
considerable demand on the resources of the German Federal Republic, the 
single biggest contributor to the EC budget. It is possible that the GDR's 
problems could require a once off transfer of resources from West Germany of 
around 5 per cent of GNP. 
Our position relative to the EC mean income will improve slightly with 
6Similar fears were expressed when Greece, Portugal and Spain became full members of the EC in the early 
1980s. 
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German unity as East German GNP per head is probably below that of 
Ireland. The membership of other Eastern European states would also raise 
Ireland's relative position while not directly affecting our absolute standard of 
living. Taken together such changes could add to pressures for EC funds and 
make Ireland seem a less deserving case for transfers. Given commitments 
already made, a reduction in EC support for Ireland is unlikely before 1994 
and even then it will probably be gradual in nature. 
A third way that Eastern Europe will affect Ireland will be through an 
increase in demand for goods produced in the West. Just as the Marshall aid 
of the post-war era served to boost European demand for American goods, 
much of the aid to Eastern Europe will find its way back to the West in the form 
of increased demand. A large fraction of these expenditures in the West will be 
on goods from the EC. While firms in the Federal Republic of Germany are 
probably in the best position to benefit from this increase in demand, capacity 
constraints in that economy, combined with the inevitable spill-over of demand 
to other EC members, will mean that the higher growth will affect Ireland. 
Much will depend on how distribution channels develop in Eastern Europe to 
cater for changing patterns of demand. Even if the benefits to Ireland are 
limited, this process must add to the growth in demand for Irish goods in 
Europe. 
In summary, recent events in Eastern Europe make the external 
environment for the Irish economy somewhat more uncertain than it otherwise 
would have been. However, the implications for the Irish economy are certainly 
not all unfavourable and it is possible that in the medium to long term the 
changes could add to growth. 
The Domestic Environment 
The likely stance of government economic policy is clearly important in 
forecasting the growth of the economy up to 1994. Our very large public debt 
will continue to exert a considerable influence on policy for some time to come. 
In addition, the high birth rate in the 1970s and 1980s implies demographic 
changes over the next ten years which differentiate Ireland from most other 
European nations. 
Ireland enters the 1990s with a severe public debt problem. Although state 
borrowing has been much reduced in recent years there remains a huge 
overhang of public debt which must be reduced if the economy is to be made 
less vulnerable to external shocks. The recent rise in interest rates is especially 
serious for Ireland because of our level of indebtedness. If the rise in real 
interest rates persists it will substantially reduce the government's room for 
manoeuvre. 
Fiscal policy this year turned out to be more relaxed than anticipated last 
June, indeed probably more stimulatory than was appropriate. This means 
that in 1991 and subsequent years there may have to be a return to a less lenient 
policy, even if there were an unexpected turn down in the world economy. As 
against this, the phasing of the CSF payments is more in line with the 
recommendations of the R.eview. 
Over the next five years we assume that, while eschewing the cutbacks of 
1987-89, fiscal policy will be somewhat tougher than this year and that the 
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Exchequer will move into surplus in 1992. This will allow some small debt 
repayment in subsequent years, reducing our exposure to developments on 
foreign financial markets. In addition, it will permit cuts in taxation or 
increases in services each year, albeit on a more limited scale than occurred in 
this year's budget. 
For the rest of the decade, as shown in FIGURE 3, the net inflow into the 
labour force will, on fairly conservative assumptions, continue at the rate of 
22,000 to 25,000 a year. This situation will continue until 1998. 7 Thereafter 
there will be a rapid fall in labour force entrants and an increase in outflow due 
to retirals so that by around 2005 the net increase will be down to around 6,000. 
What this means is that, on present trends, unemployment will, at best, fall 
slowly and emigration, while greatly reduced, is likely to remain significant till 
the end of the century. Thus unemployment and emigration will remain the 
major economic problem facing the economy for the foreseeable future. 
FIGURE3 
Net Labour Force Inflows 
Thousands 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
1986 91 96 2001 2005 
Finally, the success of the Programme for National Recovery in moderating wage 
demands and promoting industrial harmony at a time of rapidly increasing 
labour productivity has been a key factor contributing to the economic turn-
round in Ireland and the increasing profitability of the Irish industrial sector. 
However, underpinning the "success" of the Pay Agreement is the high rate of 
unemployment, particularly the disastrous rise in the years immediately 
preceding 1987. Preparations for negotiation of a new Programme are already 
7J.J. Sexton, 1990, Labour ForceFlows in an Overall Demographic Context; Projections ef Potential Labour Force Supply. 
ESRI Seminar Paper. 
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under way and, if successful, the outcome will set the pace of wage inflation for 
the next few years. Since there has been some improvement in the state of the 
labour market, the terms of any new agreement are unlikely to be as favourable 
to employers as the previous one. In preparing medium-term forecasts we have 
assumed that while moderation continues to be exercised, real wages will rise 
roughly in line with the trend growth in productivity so that profitability will 
tend to stabilise. The likelihood that over the foreseeable future tax rates will 
tend to fall (in contrast to the 1980s) should help underpin wage moderation. 
The Medium-Term Prospects for the Irish Economy 
The rise in world interest rates, changes in Eastern Europe, and the 
deterioration in the UK economy over the last six months give rise to some 
concern. However, while these developments will result in some slow-down in 
the rate of growth of the Irish economy this year, we feel that the medium-term 
prospects for the Irish economy remain good. The developments in Eastern 
Europe need not adversely affect Ireland. The present exceptional level of real 
interest rates should fall in the medium-term once the situation in Germany 
becomes clearer. The beneficial effects of 1992 have already begun to affect the 
economy. As discussed below, on the assumption of a prudent fiscal policy in 
the medium-term, the burden of our debt will lighten. 
The Overall Picture 
On the basis of the assumptions set out above we now discuss the likely path 
of development of the Irish economy over the decade. For the 1990s the growth 
rate could average just under 4 per cent a year compared to the 1.5 per cent 
FIGURE4 
Gross National Product 
Annual Percentage Change 
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a year achieved in the 1980s (FIGURE 4). To some extent in the early 1990s 
this reflects the rapid growth normal in the recovery phase of the economic 
cycle. However, the relatively benign external and domestic environment 
assumed means that sustained growth throughout the decade is likely. If 
achieved, this performance will compare favourably with that of the Irish 
economy in the last 30 years (FIGURE 5). It would be roughly in line with the 
rate of growth achieved in the 1970s, while being well above that achieved in 
the 1980s. 
FIGURE 5 
Growth in Gross National Product 
(Five Year Averages) 
Percent 5r------------------------------. 
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The rate of inflation in consumer prices, which rose to around 4 per cent in 
1989 under pressure from a general rise in world inflation would have, in the 
absence of German unification, fallen back to between 2 and 3 per cent for 
much of the 1990s. 
With the assumed fixed link between the Irish pound and the D-mark within 
the EMS, the major factor determining the rate of inflation in the long run will 
be the rate of inflation in Germany. Previous experience indicates that the 
German monetary authorities have a strong commitment to maintaining 
inflation at 2 per cent or less a year. If the Bundesbank view had prevailed in 
a united Germany this would have been transmitted to Ireland via a stronger 
exchange rate and lower interest rates. However, if, as now seems likely, the 
German rate of inflation rises as a result of unification to 3 per cent to 4 per 
cent a year, this will make it even more likely that Ireland will keep pace with 
German inflation rates (FIGURE 6). 
The outlook for domestic wages is less certain than for inflation. The Irish 
economy has undergone a major improvement in its competitive position since 
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FIGURE 6 
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1986, an improvement that owes much to the slowdown in the growth in pay 
rates over the period. The economy generally, and the industrial sector in 
particular, are currently reaping the benefits of this change. In the immediate 
future there is likely to be a continuation of such wage moderation. This will 
be sustained by the assumed reduction in tax rates each year over the decade. 
However, in spite of such moderation the rise in employment will force some 
increase in the rate of growth of real wage rates. In the longer term, while the 
continuing high rate of unemployment will act as a brake on excessive growth 
in wage rates, we anticipate that in the medium term the pace of growth in real 
wage rates will rise to around 2 per cent a year (FIGURE 6), more in line with 
experience prior to 1986. When combined with tax cuts this will allow a rise 
in real disposable income of between 3 and 3.5 per cent a year from 1992 
onwards. 
In the absence of a major domestic stimulus from either the public sector or 
from a fall in the personal savings rate, the balance of payments remains in 
surplus for the rest of the decade (FIGURE 7). This surplus allows a limited 
repayment of the debt incurred in earlier years and underpins the steady 
growth of the 1990s. Net investment abroad, which is the counterpart to the 
surplus on the current account of the balance of payments, itself feeds the 
surplus through gradually rising dividends and interest payments received 
from abroad. 
On the fiscal policy assumptions outlined above, the exchequer borrowing 
requirement effectively disappears in 1991 and moves into surplus in 1992 
(FIGURE 8). The moderate exchequer surplus is sustained in subsequent 
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years in spite of the substantial reduction in income tax rates and the limited 
growth in public services assumed over the period. As shown in FIGURE 9 this 
pattern would be sufficient to reduce the debt/GNP ratio from its current level 
of just over 120 per cent to 90 per cent in 1994. It would probably be the end 
of the decade before it would drop close to the current EC norm of 50 per cent. 
135 
125 
115 
105 
95 
FIGURE 9 
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With the continuation of the current recovery, the rate of unemployment will 
fall slowly up to 1993 and there will be a reduction in the level of net emigration 
(FIGURES 10 and 11). However, with the rise in real wage rates (and, hence, 
an end to the improvement in competitiveness) the rate of growth in 
employment in the industrial sector slows thereafter. Against the background 
of a rapidly rising labour force, after 1994 both the rate of unemployment and 
the level of emigration could begin to rise again. While the turn-down in the 
labour force growth in the first decade of the new century may render any 
increase temporary, it is clear that the problem of unemployment will remain 
at the centre of political and economic debate for the foreseeable future. 
After a period of net inward migration from 1971 to 1979, outward migration 
resumed in the 1980s and has now reached high levels similar to the depressed 
period of the 1950s and early 1960s. The migration mechanism lies at the 
centre of any discussion of functioning of the Irish labour market. If outward 
migration flows to the UK had not been facilitated in recent years by high 
growth in the UK, then the behaviour of the labour market might have been 
very different. Many factors contribute to the poor performance of the Irish 
labour market: a weak domestic demand for labour in industry and marketed 
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services; the continuing decline of employment in agriculture; the cessation 
(indeed reversal) of employment growth in public services; the relatively high 
natural growth in population. All these factors have combined to keep the rate 
of unemployment at a high level. A further very serious aspect of the 
composition of unemployment is the increasing proportion of the long-term 
unemployed. 
Inflation and the Financial Environment 
Ireland joined the EMS at the end of 1978 and participated from the start 
within the narrow band of the ERM. However, because of the serious domestic 
financial difficulties and the absence of the UK (Ireland's main trading 
partner) from the ERM, the financial markets did not see a fixed link between 
the Irish pound and the D-mark as being sustainable. The failure to adopt 
suitable public expenditure and taxation policies to support such a fixed link 
meant that interest rates and the rate of inflation did not initially converge 
towards D-mark rates. Successive depreciations of the Irish pound against the 
D-mark within the ERM confirmed this pattern. However, since the last 
devaluation of the Irish pound within the ERM in 1986, circumstances have 
changed. The balance of payments has moved into surplus; the exchequer 
borrowing requirement has been greatly reduced and is soon set to disappear; 
the rate of wage and price inflation has fallen to the EC average, or less. 
The prospect that these circumstances will continue to prevail during the 
1990s makes the current Irish pound/D-mark rate sustainable. This in turn 
helps narrow the differential between Irish and D-mark interest rates, further 
improving competitiveness. These trends will be reinforced by further 
movement towards EMU. As a result, there is likely to be continuing 
convergence of the Irish rate of inflation and Irish interest rates towards 
German rates. The final establishment of credibility for the Irish pound in the 
EMS may take some time, particularly in the light of Ireland's exposure to the 
UK economy (and, of course, the UK's absence at present from the ERM), so 
that the margin between Irish and D-mark interest rates should narrow slowly 
over the next few years. These trends will be reinforced by further movement 
towards a European Monetary Union. In addition, if a united Germany were 
to weaken the D-mark it would make it all the more likely that Irish interest 
rates would converge to German rates. As a result, a continuing convergence 
of the Irish rate of inflation and Irish interest rates towards German rates seems 
probable. 
The forecast continuing balance of payments surplus and the emergence of 
an exchequer surplus will mean that the pattern of investment of the funds 
available domestically will be very different in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. 
The exchequer will, if anything, be repaying debt and will have no need for the 
funds. The balance of payments surplus will involve a continuing capital 
outflow as either the government repays debt or the private sector invests 
abroad. The forecast assumes that the surplus funds continue to be invested in 
financial assets rather than giving rise to an even more rapid increase in the 
volume of investment in physical assets. This will maintain downward pressure 
on domestic interest rates with the D-mark rates continuing to provide an 
effective floor. 
49 
Conclusion 
The changes in Eastern Europe over the last six months have introduced a 
new element of uncertainty about the economic future. It is likely that there 
will be a more rapid growth in the EC and in the potential foreign markets for 
Irish goods. The changing nature of these markets could require some 
reorientation of our industrial and exporting strategy. However, given the 
relative economic strengths of the EC and the Eastern European countries, the 
bulk of effective demand for Irish goods will still come from the more 
traditional EC markets either directly or indirectly. 
The changing circumstances arising from German unification will require 
some review of our domestic policies. The increased rate of growth in Germany 
will be particularly important for us. However, if it is accompanied by higher 
real interest rates in the medium-term it will make the domestic task of debt 
reduction more difficult. This could mean that there will be less scope for tax 
cuts in the immediate future. 
There are a wide range of structural problems facing the Irish economy over 
the next five years. Policy to deal with them is too often forgotten in the rush 
to deal with current problems. However, by continuing to ignore them we do 
little to promote the long-term growth of the economy. While public policy can 
help create a suitable environment for the Irish economy in the 1990s, it is up 
to the private sector to seize the new opportunities which present themselves. 
This will require greater flexibility in dealing with the rapidly changing market 
in Europe. Opportunities which were not present in the past will arise from the 
opening up of public procurement. They will also arise from the integration 
into the Western European economy of the newly emerging democracies in the 
East. 
TABLE 1: Medium-Term Forecast - Major Aggregates 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
GNP % Change - 1.1 5.6 0.8 5.0 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.3 3.8 
Balance of Payments, 
% of GNP - 3.0 1.3 2.3 1.7 1.7 1. 7 2.3 2.5 2.8 
EBR % of GNP - 12.8 -9.9 - 3.3 -2.3 -1.4 -0.5 0.2 0.4 0.7 
Debt/GNP Ratio 138 138 132 122 115 109 102 96 90 
Total Employment (OOO) 1081 1080 1091 1090 1106 1123 1141 1160 1176 
Unemployment Rate % 17.4 17. 7 16.7 1.5. 7 14.8 14.0 13.9 13.8 13.8 
Consumer Prices % 4.0 2.6 2.5 4.0 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
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